Hobby Lobby ruling upholds opposition to abortion

07/01/2014 09:25

by Kathy Ostrowski



The U.S. Supreme Court upheld yesterday, by a 5-4 majority, the right of business owners to operate their family companies without violating their deeply held religious convictions against abortion.

The decision in the Sebelius (now Burwell) v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. ruling, is here, with legal comment here.

 

Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion, declaring that the 'HHS contraception mandate' (a regulation issued under Obamacare) substantially burdens the Constitutionally-protected free exercise of religion.
 

The essence of this ruling is that the government may not create an artifice of a health mandate to force citizens to underwrite and promote abortion.

Although regularly termed as litigation against the HHS contraceptive mandate, Hobby Lobby (and other businesses) filed suit specifically in objection to being forced to provide some contraceptives-those that act to abort human embryos-under the HHS mandate.


Specifically, they objected to 2 drugs and 2 IUD devices, labeled as contraceptive, that actually can prevent implantation of the already-formed human embryo into the womb for gestation, also called a 'post-fertilization abortifacient function'. (Read a thorough analysis of contraceptives from pro-life OB/GYN, Donna Harrison here.)

 

Furthermore, when evaluating the governmental interference with religion, the Court found that the HHS mandate violates the "least restrictive means" test of the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). RFRA demands that interference with religious freedom must be based on a compelling governmental interest, and be executed in the least restrictive means needed. Without ruling whether the goal of insurance provision of contraception is really a compelling governmental interest, the Court ruled that the HHS mandate, as a means of achieving that goal, is out of bounds.
 

The Court affirmed that freedom of religious expression is not limited to a person in his/her private, individual capacity, but -as set out in RFRA - extends to him/her when acting as a corporation.